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Abstract. In network interdiction problems, evaders (e.g., hostile agents
or data packets) may be moving through a network towards targets and
we wish to choose locations for sensors in order to intercept the evaders
before they reach their destinations. The evaders might follow deter-
ministic routes or Markov chains, or they may be reactive, i.e., able to
change their routes in order to avoid sensors placed to detect them. The
challenge in such problems is to choose sensor locations economically,
balancing security gains with costs, including the inconvenience sensors
inflict upon innocent travelers. We study the objectives of 1) maximizing
the number of evaders captured when limited by a budget on sensing cost
and 2) capturing all evaders as cheaply as possible.
We give optimal sensor placement algorithms for several classes of spe-
cial graphs and hardness and approximation results for general graphs,
including for deterministic or Markov chain-based and reactive or obliv-
ious evaders. In a similar-sounding but fundamentally different problem
setting posed by [7] where both evaders and innocent travelers are re-
active, we again give optimal algorithms for special cases and hardness
and approximation results on general graphs.
Keywords: network interdiction, bridge policy, submodular set cover,
Markov chain, minimal cut
1 Introduction
In network interdiction problems, one or more evaders (e.g., smugglers or terror-
ists, or hostile data packets) travel through a network, beginning at some initial
locations and attempting to reach some targets. Our goal is to stop them. We do
so by placing sensors on nodes in hopes that most or all the evaders will pass by
a sensor and thus be captured (or intercepted) before reaching their destinations.
We take as given the evader movement dynamics, which may be either deter-
ministic (each evader specified by a path from source to target) or stochastic,
e.g. each evader specified by a Markov chain whose states are the nodes of the
network. Evader ei induces a subgraph Gi ⊆ G in which she roams, according
to the probabilities specified by her Markov chain. An unreactive or oblivious
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evader [10] behaves the same regardless of the choice of sensor locations (or in-
terdiction sites), and so her set of possible routes can be construed as objects we
wish to pierce.
We try to make economical use of the sensors—i.e., to balance the benefits
of security (the interdiction of many or all evaders) with the total cost (widely
defined) of doing so. The cost of placing a sensor at a given node can incorpo-
rate the cost of the device itself, the effort or danger involved in performing the
placement, and the inconvenience it causes to any innocent travelers subjected
to it. If traffic flow estimates on the graph’s edges are known for both evaders
and innocent travelers, then it is natural to try to place sensors where they will
intercept many evaders but inconvenience few innocents. If a sensor acts as a
checkpoint, capturing the evaders but examining and then letting pass the inno-
cents, then the inconvenience cost can be incorporated directly into the node’s
sensor placement cost since placing two sensors on an innocent’s path inconve-
niences her twice. In this model we study two natural objectives: 1) maximizing
the (expected, weighted) number of evaders captured while respecting a budget
on sensing cost, and 2) capturing all evaders (with probability 1) as cheaply
as possible. In the latter case evaders may be reactive, i.e., able to observe the
sensor locations and choose a different path in Gi. Regardless, ei is guaranteed
to be captured only if her target node is separated from all her source nodes
within subgraph Gi. We solve these problems optimally in several special graph
settings and give hardness and approximation results in general settings.
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Fig. 1. A bridges problem in-
stance represented as network
interdiction with three interme-
diate nodes corresponding to
bridges. An innocent begins at
node 2 and evaders begin at
nodes 1,3,4.
In contrast, allowing the innocents also to
react to sensor locations changes the character
of the problem significantly. In this setting we
study a special case of the problem which was
posed by Glazer & Rubinstein [7], motivated by
the following scenario: there are a collection of
bridges crossing a river, with each traveler p re-
stricted to using some set σ(p) of bridges (be-
cause of p’s preferences or geography, say), and
the task is to decide which bridges to open and
close. This can be viewed as a special case of
our network setting in which every travel path
is of length 2 but with the restriction that sen-
sors cannot be placed on a traveler’s start node
(see Fig. 1). Note that in this special case, sen-
sors can also be viewed as roadblocks, in the
sense that placing a sensor on a node effectively
means deleting the node from the network for
evader and innocent alike.
This change yields a setting in which the problem instance is specified by
a set system with real-valued elements that may be either positive or negative,
corresponding to the value or cost (respectively) of capturing evaders or block-
ing innocents. Several possible objective functions could be considered, such
as capturing all evaders while blocking as few innocents as possible or cap-
turing as many evaders as possible given a budget allowing a certain number of
blocked innocents. Unfortunately, the former is precisely the Red-Blue Set Cover
problem, which is “strongly inapproximable” (hard to approximate with factor
Ω(2log
1−
m) for any  > 0 (where m is the number of sets, or bridges) unless
NP ⊆ DTIME(mpolylog(m))) [20]; the latter turns out to be harder still (see
Appendix A). Instead, we next study objectives suggested by [7] that combine
the two goals into a single score, where captured (i.e. unsuccessful) innocents and
uncaptured (i.e. successful) evaders can be construed as false positives (FP ) and
false negatives (FN), respectively: maximize the “net flow” (TN −FN) or min-
imize the total errors (FP + FN). Although the TN − FN model turns out
to be hard to approximate with factor n1− (once again, see Appendix A), we
obtain nontrivial approximation results for the FP + FN setting.
Contributions. With oblivious evaders and innocents, we solve the budgeted
problem optimally in path and cycle graphs. With oblivious innocents (and
evaders either oblivious or not), we solve the full interdiction problem opti-
mally in paths, cycles, and trees. (In the edge sensor model, full interdiction is
2-approximable, which is the optimal approximation factor assuming UGC.)
In general graphs, we give hardness results including showing that the bud-
geted problem is NP-hard with even one Markovian evader, strengthening the
hardness result of [8] which held only for two or more such evaders. In contrast,
we show that full interdiction with a single evader is in P. With m possible
evader paths, the problem is Hm-approximable (where Hm =
∑m
i=1
1
i ), which is
essentially optimal, given certain complexity-theoretic assumptions.
When both evaders and innocents are reactive, we optimally solve a special
case in which the graph and travelers’ sets of paths can be represented by bridges
and convex bridge sets, respectively. We also show that FP+FN is approximable
with factor one plus the maximum size of any innocent’s bridge set.
Related Work. The problems analyzed here belong to a large class of discrete
optimization problems, collectively termed Network Interdiction [2, 9, 16, 19].
They are motivated by applications such as supply chains, electronic sensing,
and counter-terrorism and relate to classical optimization problems like Set
Cover and Max Coverage. Our setting of budgeted interdiction with determin-
istic evaders on the path graph can be solved by a complicated algorithm given
by [17], but we present a much simpler algorithm. Recent work on Set Cover
with submodular costs [12, 15] applies to some of our settings. Previous work
on the Unreactive Markovian Evader (UME) interdiction problem (maximiz-
ing the expected number of Markov chain-based evaders captured with B sen-
sors) showed that it is already NP-hard with just two evaders [8] and that it
is ee−1 -approximable by the natural greedy algorithm [10], which is the optimal
approximation factor (we prove this for completeness in Proposition 4).
Other evader models have been studied such as the Most Vital Nodes Prob-
lem, in which the task is to delete a set of nodes in order to maximize the weight
of the shortest path from source to destination [1, 2] or to decrease the maxi-
mum flow [11, 21], both of which could be construed as frustrating an evader’s
progress. Such evaders are reactive in the sense that the routes they take are
modified based on the set of available edges or nodes. In [9], an intermediate
model was studied in which the evader follows a parametrized generalization of
shortest path and random walk.
The Bridges problem was introduced by Glazer & Rubinstein [7] in an eco-
nomics context, primarily motivated in terms of strategies for a listener to accept
good arguments and reject bad arguments. In this setting, (positive/negative)
states correspond to (positive/negative) people and allowing oneself to be per-
suaded by a statement corresponds to opening a bridge.
2 Preliminaries
Given is a graph G(V,E) with |V | = n unless otherwise noted, used by travelers
(or people) of two types: evaders (or bads) and innocents (or goods). (These
terms are used interchangeably.) Each person p can travel within some subgraph
Gp ⊆ G. Depending on the setting, sensors can be placed on nodes or edges
to capture the flow passing through. A user p’s Markov chain determines the
probability weight fp,v of p’s traffic through each node v. If oblivious, p is unable
to shift her flow fp,v from the path going through v to some other path, so
placing a sensor at v captures all of fp,v (or at least whatever portion of it was
not captured upstream). In some settings we assume all innocents, all evaders,
or both are oblivious, as discussed below.
We emphasize that reactive indicates a two-stage setting in which all the
sensors are placed and then p can choose an unblocked path in Gp if one exists.
Sensors are not deployed in sequence over time. We also emphasize that person
p is restricted to subgraph Gp regardless of whether p is oblivious or reactive,
an evader or an innocent.
Edge and Node Interdiction. In edge interdiction, sensors are installed on
edges and are represented by a matrix of decision variables r: ruv = 1 if (u, v)
has a sensor placed at it (with cost cuv) and 0 otherwise. If an evader crosses
an edge with a sensor she is detected with probability 1. In node interdiction,
placing a sensor on node u (with cost cu) means setting ruv = 1 for every edge
(u, v), that is, interdicting all evaders leaving u). A sensor on a target node does
not protect that node itself but will stop evaders as they pass through it.
The node and edge settings are equivalent in general, directed graphs with
location-varying costs, in the sense that a problem in one setting can be trans-
formed into the other [10]. Although the UME model is defined for convenience in
terms of edge interdiction, unless otherwise stated we assume node interdiction.
Oblivious Evaders. An evader is specified in terms of the probabilities of her
taking various routes, where a route is a walk (possibly containing cycles) ending
at a target node. A Markovian evader is represented by a Markov chain given by
an initial source distribution a over nodes and a transition probability matrix M.
The matrix M has the property that a specified target node t is an absorbing
state: upon reaching t the evader is removed from the network. Under mild
restrictions on the Markov chain such as this, the probability of capturing the
evader can be expressed in closed form [10]:
J(a,M, r) = 1−
(
a [I− (M−M r)]−1
)
t
(1)
where the symbol  indicates element-wise (Hadamard) multiplication. This for-
mulation generalizes to a setting of multiple simultaneous evaders, each realized
with probability we, or equivalently having weight wi representing the impor-
tance of capturing her. The probability of capturing ei is denoted by Ji(r).
Definition 1. An evader ei is specified by a (Mi,ai) pair. Evader ei is deter-
ministic if from each of her possible starting nodes, Mi specifies a single next
node with probability 1, and is nondeterministic otherwise. In both cases, ai may
specify multiple starting points with positive probability.
Budgeted Interdiction (BI). The BI objective is to capture as many evaders
as possible, given a budget on sensors. More precisely, suppose we have a bound
on the number of nodes we can monitor (or on their total cost, with costs always
scaled to be integral). Any choice of some subset of nodes to observe deter-
mines a probability that a given evader will be captured (i.e., that she will pass
through at least one observed node) prior to reaching her target t. The task in
Budgeted Interdiction is to maximize the expected (weighted) number of evaders
interdicted, subject to a budget B on sensor costs:
maximize
∑
i
wiJi(r) such that
∑
u
rucu ≤ B
Full Interdiction (FI). This problem seeks a minimum-cost set of nodes to
observe in order to capture all evaders (denoted by D) with probability one.
minimize
∑
u
rucu such that
∑
i
Ji(r) = |D|
Reactive Evaders and Innocents. In this setting both types of travelers are
reactive, which means a traveler is captured only if all her paths within Gp from
source nodes to target node have received a sensor placed on some node prior
to the target. Let wˆp indicate the cost of having person p succeed, which is
negative if p is good, and let binary variables xp = 1 indicate p’s success and
ys = 1 indicate that bridge s is open. Let N indicate the goods and D the bads.
Then in the following formulation of the Bridges Problem the constraints code
for the requirement that xp = maxs∈σ(p) ys, i.e., traveler p can cross iff at least
one of her bridges is open, and the objective is to minimize the sum of errors
(failed goods + successful bads).
minimize
∑
p∈D
wˆpxp+
∑
p∈N
wˆp(1−xp) such that xp ≤
∑
s∈σ(p)
ys ∀p and xp ≥ ys ∀p,∀s ∈ σ(p)
Let TP, FP, TN, FN indicate the weighted numbers of true positives (bads
failing to cross), false positives (goods failing), true negatives (goods succeeding),
and false negatives (bads succeeding), respectively. We focus on the objective of
minimizing FP + FN , in the problem setting in which each traveler’s path
from source to target passes through exactly one other node, a bridge. Since the
bridges are the decision points, with closed corresponding to receiving a sensor
and open corresponding to not, in this problem we use n to denote the number
of bridges. The problem setting as defined generalizes to graphs in the roadblock
model by replacing each bridge set σ(p) with a set of paths to some target node.
A traveler p (either bad or good) is then captured if her target is disconnected
from all her starting nodes in Gp as for evaders before (where placing a sensor
on a node means deleting it), and otherwise inflicts cost wˆp. Since each path
is essentially a single edge, sensors can (as mentioned above) be thought of as
either checkpoints or roadblocks.
3 Oblivious innocents and evaders oblivious or not
3.1 Paths, trees, and cycles
In this section we consider the Budgeted (BI) and Full Interdiction (FI) problems
where the graph G (on n nodes) is one of several special topologies.
Definition 2. In a path graph P with nodes numbered 1 through n, an interval
[x, y] indicates the sequence of nodes numbered x through y (with x ≤ y) the inter-
val’s startpoint and endpoint, respectively. Half-open intervals [x, y) = [x, y− 1]
and (x, y] = [x + 1, y] are defined similarly. For nodes x, y we write x < y to
indicate that x precedes y in P . Similarly, in a tree T , an interval [x, y] is the
sequence of nodes lying on the path in T from x to y. A node v pierces interval
[x, y] if v ∈ [x, y]. An interval sequence is a set of intervals that can be ordered
so that each interval is strictly contained by the previous one. All the intervals in
a suffix sequence share the same endpoint; all the intervals in a prefix sequence
share the same start point.
The budgeted problem is solvable in polynomial time as we show below. It
will follow that FI is also solvable by searching for the smallest budget B that
permits full interdiction. The problem can be solved more efficiently, however.
Theorem 1. When cv = 1 ∀v, Full Interdiction is optimally solvable in O(n log n)
time on paths.
Proof. Consider an evader ei with start nodes Si and a target node ti. We must
capture evader ei in the case of each starting point s ∈ Si before she reaches
node ti. Node s lies either to the left or right of ti, assume to the left, i.e.,
s < ti (e.g., node 3 in Fig. 2). Evader ei may (probabilistically) move to the left
before returning right, and so a sensor placed to the left of s may capture the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.15 0.15
0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
Fig. 2. An instance of Network Interdiction with two stochastic evaders on the graph
P12. One evader is traveling from nodes 3 and 8 to 6, and one is traveling from nodes 3
and 11 to 9. Because of their stochastic motion the evaders could be partially interdicted
at nodes such as 1 or 12 that do not lie on the shortest paths to their targets.
evader with positive probability. For capturing ei with probability 1, however,
it is necessary and sufficient to place a sensor somewhere in the interval [s, ti)
([3, 6) for the first evader e1 in Fig. 2).
Each starting point s of evader ei will correspond to an interval [s, ti) or
interval (ti, s], depending on the relative location of s to ti. Each such interval
must be pierced. Intervals of the former kind (with the evader approaching the
target from the left) will form a sequences of suffix intervals; intervals of the
latter kind (with the evader is approaching from the right) will form a sequence
of prefix intervals. In the worst case, it could be necessary to consider m =
O(n2) intervals because each interval may be traversed with positive probability
by some evader. It suffices to consider each evader’s smallest left interval and
smallest right interval ([3, 6) and (6, 8] for e1 in Fig. 2)), since each such interval
is contained within all others in the sequence. We build an interval graph H
by associating a node with each smallest interval (each of which can be found
in time O(log n) by binary search) and placing an undirected edge for any two
smallest intervals that intersect. Because the cost of piercing any interval is
cv = 1, and because each intersection of intervals corresponds to a clique of H,
Full Interdiction is equivalent to Minimum Clique Cover on H. The latter is
solvable in linear time on the interval graph (plus time for sorting) [3]. uunionsq
A generalization is also possible, as follows.
Theorem 2. When cv = 1 ∀v, Full Interdiction is optimally solvable in O(n3)
time on trees.
Proof. The O(n2) intervals are now paths in the tree, whose intersection graph
(constructable in O(n3)) is a chordal graph, on which Minimum Clique Cover
can also be solved in linear time [6]. uunionsq
For the setting of edge sensors, Full Interdiction is closely related to the
Minimum Directed Multicut (MDM) problem, in which the task is to find a
minimum cut that separates each of k source-sink pairs (si, ti).
Proposition 1. In the edge interdiction setting, Full Interdiction is 2-approximable
on trees, which is the optimal factor (assuming the Unique Games Conjec-
ture [14]).
Proof. When restricted to an underlying tree graph, the Full Interdiction prob-
lem is identical to Directed Multicut. uunionsq
Definition 3. For a possible route r traveled by some evader, let Vr indicate the
nodes visited along route r before reaching its target, or the route set of r. Let
m be the number of distinct route sets among all evaders.
Note that multiple distinct routes can give rise to the same route set, and
that a route set in a path graph is always an interval with an end point at the
target node. We now turn to Budgeted Interdiction.
Theorem 3. Let m be the total number of different evader route sets. Budgeted
Interdiction with deterministic evaders and (integer) budget B is optimally solv-
able on the path graph in time O(Bnm) = O(Bn3).
Proof. We give a dynamic programming solution in Algorithm 1. We compute
an optimal solution using a table opt[`, vˆ, b] that stores the optimal solution
restricted to the ` left-most intervals, nodes 1...vˆ and budget b. We first compute
the value of node v restricted to the first ` intervals, i.e., val[`, v] is the sum of
the weights of those intervals when the only sensor is node v. Each subproblem
solution is computed in constant time: given inputs `, v, b, if v is not chosen,
then the optimal solution value is the same as inputs `, v − 1, b; if v is chosen,
then the optimal solution value is the value of choosing v in this situation, plus
optimal solution on the intervals lying to the left of v, using the first v−1 nodes
and a budget of b− cv (or 0 if b− cv < 0).
Proof of correctness is by induction: if node v is chosen, then due to the linear
ordering, nodes prior to v only contribute to piercing intervals 1 through pr(v).
Note that correctness holds also when interval weights may be negative. uunionsq
The case of nondeterministic evaders is more complicated since, as noted
above, it gives rise to sequences of suffix intervals and sequences of prefix inter-
vals. For each such sequence corresponding to a single nondeterministic evader,
the computation of val[`, v] will be based on all the intervals in the sequence
that v pierces. More precisely, let {[1, t), [2, t), ..., [s, t)} be a suffix sequence for
some nondeterministic evader ei with source s and target t. For each node v < t
there is some probability pv that placing a sensor at node v suffices for capturing
ei. Namely, pv is 1 for any v ∈ [s, t), while for each node v < s the probability pv
can be computed based on the Markov chain of ei, that is, just the probability
that her Markov chain visits v and is computed as follows. For ei’s Markov chain
(a,M), let M−v denote a transition matrix where row v has been replaced by
zeros, i.e. the chain with v as a killing state. Then pv =
(
a [I−M−v]−1
)
v
.
Algorithm 1 Budgeted Interdiction DP for Evaders on the Path Graph
1: sort the O(n2) intervals by right endpoint
2: pr[v] = index of the last interval lying before node v, or 0 if none for every v
3: val[`, v] = value of node v, restricted to intervals 1 to `, for every v, `
4: opt[0, v, b] = 0 for every v, b
5: opt[`, 0, b] = 0 for every `, b
6: opt[`, v, 0] = 0 for every `, v
7: for b = 1 to B do
8: for ` = 1 to m do
9: for v = 1 to n do
10: opt[`, v, b] = max{opt[`, v− 1, b], val[`, v] + opt[pr[v], v− 1,max(0, b− cv)]}
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: return opt[m,n,B]
For each interval in the sequence, we now define a marginal probability pˆv
as follows: pˆ1 = p1; pˆv = pv − pv−1 for 1 < v ≤ s, and pˆv = 1 − ps−1 for
s ≤ v < t. By construction, the pˆv values for all intervals containing a given
node u will sum to exactly the probability of evader ei reaching node u, and
hence of such a sensor placement sufficing to capture evader ei. (The values
labeling the intervals in Fig. 2 are the marginal probabilities, weighted by the
probability of choosing their starting points.) Marginal probabilities are assigned
to prefix intervals similarly. Therefore the value of a set of sensor locations for a
given instance of the problem with nondeterministic evaders is exactly the value
of those locations for the resulting problem instance with interval sequences
of deterministic evaders; that is, the nondeterministic problem reduces to the
deterministic problem (albeit with up to a factor n more intervals). Thus we
have the following.
Theorem 4. Budgeted Interdiction with nondeterministic evaders is optimally
solvable on the path graph, in time O(Bn2m) = O(Bn4).
These problems can also be solved on the cycle by reduction to path graphs.
Theorem 5. Full Interdiction is optimally solvable in O(n2) time on the cycle
graph. Budgeted Interdiction with deterministic or nondeterministic evaders and
budget B is optimally solvable on the cycle graph in time O(Bn4) or O(Bn5),
respectively.
Proof. For the minimization problem, we reduce to a collection of n path graph
instances, corresponding to n ways to “cut” the cycle graph, as follows. For each
node v ∈ V , consider placing a sensor at node v. It will pierce some set of inter-
vals, with the effect that none of the remaining intervals to pierce include node
v, yielding a path graph instance with nodes v + 1, ..., n, 1, ..., v − 1. Solve each
resulting path graph instance in linear time, and return the cheapest solution
(combined with v). The budgeted problems are solved by a similar reduction. uunionsq
The process can be generalized to Full Interdiction on arbitrary graphs contain-
ing c cycles, though at a cost of O(nc): find all the cycles [13] and then explore
all possible cuts.
3.2 General graphs
We show that Budgeted Interdiction (BI) is hard already with one Markovian
evader. This improves on the result in [8] which held for two or more evaders.
Theorem 6. Budgeted Interdiction is NP-hard even with a single Markovian
evader.
Proof. We reduce from Vertex Cover (VC) to the decision problem of determin-
ing whether the interdiction probability J can be raised to a certain threshold
using at most B sensors. Given a VC problem instance, i.e., a graph G on n
nodes and an integer B, we construct a network interdiction (NI) instance with
a Markovian evader on a graph G′. The graph G′ extends graph G by adding a
target node t, which is made adjacent to all other nodes. We define the evader
e thus. Each node corresponds to a state of its Markov chain. All non-target
nodes are equally likely to be chosen as e’s start node. When at a given node v,
e moves to the target t with probability 50%; otherwise, e moves to one of v’s
other neighbors, chosen uniformly at random.
For a particular solution, let the profit for a node be the probability of inter-
diction if the evader starts at that node. We will now show that the VC instance
admits a vertex cover of size B iff the NI instance admits a size-B solution of
profit at least B + (n − B)/2. Note that an overall interdiction probability of
(n+B)
2n is the same as a total profit of (n+B)/2 = B+ (n−B)/2 over all nodes.
First assume there is a size-B vertex cover C of G. Then an NI solution with
sensors placed at all the nodes in C will have profit B+ (n−B)2 : 1 for each of the
B nodes in C plus 1/2 for each of the remaining n−B nodes, since for any node
v not in C, all v’s neighbors in G must be in C.
Now assume there is no size-B vertex cover, and consider a set S of B nodes,
a set which must fail to cover some edge. Again for each of the B nodes in S we
have profit 1. Every other node v will have profit at most 1/2, since without its
own sensor, an evader starting at v goes directly to t with probability 1/2. But
now consider an edge (u, v) that is left uncovered by S. The evasion probability
when starting at u is greater than 1/2—at least 1/2 + 1/(4 deg(G))—since if e
reaches node v, it now has a second chance to move to t, and so the profit of u is
less than 1/2. Therefore the total profit is strictly less than B + (n−B)/2. uunionsq
It follows from the hardness proof of [8] that Full Interdiction is NP-hard with
2 evaders. It does not remain hard when limited to a single evader, however.
Theorem 7. Full Interdiction with one evader is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. We solve the problem by reducing to a Min Cut problem. Given a set of
routes specifying the evader’s behavior, we introduce a source node s pointing to
all start nodes of its Markov chain. All edges that the evader has zero probability
of reaching and crossing are removed from the graph G. Any unreachable nodes
are also removed. Now, in order to interdict the evader before they reach t, we
must delete vertices in order to separate s from t in G. It is well known that
this Min Vertex Cut problem can be solved in polynomial time, by reduction to
Directed Min Cut, as follows [4]. First replace any undirected edge with a pair
of directed edges. Then replace each node v (other than s or t) with a pair of
nodes and directed edge (va, vb), where each edge directed to v is now directed
to va and each edge directed from v is now directed from vb. We compute a Min
Cut on the resulting graph G′. If any edge is chosen that does not correspond to
a node in G, we can substitute one of the edges corresponding to its two vertices
(if one of these is the target, then the non-target node is chosen). The resulting
modified Min Cut solution to G′ will correspond to a Min Vertex Cut solution
to G, and moreover to a Full Interdiction solution. uunionsq
We now turn to approximation algorithms for the general setting, by relating
interdiction to the Set Cover and Maximum Coverage problems. It was shown in
[10] that weighted Budgeted Interdiction with any number of Markovian evaders
is 1-1/e-approximable, which is the optimal factor (see Appendix A).
Identifying nodes and route sets with elements and sets in the Hitting Set
problem yields a reversible reduction, and hence the following immediately re-
sults:
Corollary 1. Full Interdiction is hard to approximate with factor (1 − ) lnm
for any  > 0, assuming NP ⊆ DTIME(mO(log logm)) but can be approximated
with factor Hm in time polynomial in n+m.
Proof. We reduce from Set Cover, as in [10], creating a node for each set and a
route set (with a corresponding deterministic evader) for each element. uunionsq
4 Reactive innocents and the Bridges problem
Since maximizing the “net flow” TN − FN [7] turns out to be as hard to ap-
proximate as Maximum Independent Set (see Appendix A), we focus primarily
on the the min-error FP + FN setting. A geometric or “convex” version of the
min-error problem is optimally solvable, however. Since the two objective func-
tions differ only by a constant and a negation (TN − FN = (wN − FP )− FN ,
where wN indicates the total value of all goods), the same holds for the net flow
problem.
4.1 Convex bridge sets
Definition 4. An instance of the Bridges Problem is convex if the bridges can
be ordered so that if two bridges x and y are accessible to a person p then any
bridge z with x < z < y is accessible to p as well.
The problem example shown in Figure 1 in the introduction is convex. We assume
that the indices of people are sorted in order of their positions from left to right
and the bridge indices are sorted in order of their rightmost accessing person.
This setting can be solved by mapping it to Budgeted Interdiction on the path
graph and adapting Algorithm 1.
Corollary 2. The convex Bridges problem is solvable in time O(n|N |+n|D|) =
O(n3).
Proof. Given a Bridges problem instance (say in the min-error formulation), we
introduce a Budgeted Interdiction instance (with budget arbitrarily large) as
follows. Each of the bridges is identified with a node on the path graph. For
each traveler p we define an evader p on the interval Ip, where Ip are all bridges
available to p. This produces |N |+ |D| ≤ n(n− 1) distinct intervals. The weight
of evader p is set to negation of the traveler’s cost: wp = −wˆp.
The formulations are now equivalent: in the Bridges Problem, a traveler
succeeds iff one or more of her bridges is open; in BI, an evader is interdicted iff
one or more of the nodes in her interval is interdicted by a sensor.
Then we pass the instance to an adaptation of Algorithm 1: we remove the
budget dimension from the dynamic programming table and also remove the
outer loop iterating over budget values, saving a factor of O(b) in running time.
The resulting algorithm computes an optimal interdiction solution. (Recall that
Algorithm 1 supports intervals with weights both positive and negative.) Given
this solution, we then solve the Bridges problem by opening a bridge iff the
corresponding node has a sensor placed at it. uunionsq
4.2 The Min-error FP + FN setting
NP-hardness of optimally solving the min-error setting follows from the hard-
ness of the net-flow setting: maximizing TN − FN is the same as minimizing
FN − TN = FN − (|N | − FP ) = FP + FN − |N |. The hardness of approxi-
mation properties, however, are not the same. In fact, the min-error problem
is precisely the Positive-Negative Partial Set Cover Problem [18], which, as
a generalization of Red-Blue Set Cover, is strongly inapproximable (hard to
approximate with factor Ω(2log
1−
m)) (where m is the number of sets) unless
NP ⊆ DTIME(mpolylog(m)) though approximable with factor 2√(m+ pi) log pi,
where pi is the number of goods.
Glazer & Rubinstein define what we will call a claw as an object c consisting
of a good gc and minimal set of bads Bc such that for each bridge s ∈ σ(gc), s is
also in σ(bi) for some bad bi ∈ Bc, which means that in any consistent solution,
either gc must fail or at least one bi must succeed. They show that this is also
a sufficient condition for being a valid solution, and hence obtain a Set Cover
problem: for each claw, choose a person to err on, with minimum total error
cost over all claws. Unfortunately, this instance in general has exponentially
many constraints (since for each good g with bridge set σ(g), each of whose
bridges admit some number bads(s) of bads, there will be |C| = Πs∈σgbads(s)
many claws), and so the O(log |C|) approximability of set cover becomes trivially
weak. We therefore modify the definition of claw slightly as follows.
Definition 5. A claw is an object c consisting of a good gc and, for each bridge
si ∈ σ(gc) the set b ∈ σ−1(si) of all the bads who can use bridge si.
Each claw c therefore imposes the following constraint: in any valid solution,
either gc must fail or all the bads in σ
−1(si) for some si ∈ σ(gc) must succeed.
Given c, let a kill move be the action of killing gc; let an open bridge move be
the action of opening some bridge si. Now we can interpret this problem as an
instance of Submodular Cost Set Cover [12,15] in which the elements are claws
and there are two kinds of sets. For each possible kill move mg, introduce a set
Mg = {g}; for each possible open bridge move mi, introduce a set Mi consisting
of all the claws that opening bridge i would satisfy. There are N elements (claws)
and N +m sets (moves).
Theorem 8. The general FP + FN Bridges problem is (1 + maxg∈N |σ(g)|)-
approximable.
Proof. First we claim that the cost of a set of moves is submodular. Indeed, the
cost of each kill move is simply the additive cost of the specified good failing;
the marginal cost of an open bridge move is monotonically decreasing since it
is based on the number of additional bads that opening the bridge then allows
to succeed. Second we claim that the value of the total error of the Bridge
solution returned is at most the cost of the moves chosen. Indeed, first, the only
time bridges are opened is during bridge moves, and so the total cost of bads
succeeding is at most the cost of the open bridge moves; second, when bridges
are closed at the end, all constraints have been handled, and so the failures of all
goods have already been “paid for”, in the cost of the kill moves. Therefore the
algorithms of [12,15] apply, which provide a solution with approximation factor
f , which is the maximum number of sets that any element appears in. In the
constructed set cover instance, f translates into 1 plus maxg∈N |σ(g)|. uunionsq
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A Other hardness results
The following two results are approximation-preserving reductions from the Max-
imum Independent Set (MIS) problem, which is hard to approximate with factor
n1− (where |V | = n) for any  > 0 [22]. A MIS instance consists of a graph
G = (V,E) and a positive integer k.
Proposition 2. The Bridges problem variant in which the goal is to maximize
TN subject to a bound on FN is NP-hard to approximate with factor n1−.
Proof. In our reduction, each vertex v becomes a bridge sv and a bad bv who
can cross only sv. Each edge (u, v) becomes k+1 goods who can cross bridges su
and sv. The bound on FN is set to k, which prevents any two goods connected
by an edge from both failing. uunionsq
Proposition 3. The net-flow TN − FN setting of the Bridges problem is NP-
hard to approximate with factor n1−.
Proof. In our reduction, each vertex becomes a bridge and (usually) some bad
people, and each edge becomes a good person. All the people introduced have
value 1 or -1. Specifically, for each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a bridge sv and
deg(v) − 1 bads, whose only accessible bridge is sv itself. (If deg(v) = 0, we
similarly introduce one good.) For each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, we introduce a
good pe, whose accessible bridges are u and v.
We now claim that the MIS instance has a solution of value at least k iff the
Bridges problem instance does. First, assume there is an independent set S of
size k. For each vertex v ∈ S, we open the corresponding bridge. Each bridge
sv with deg(v) = 0 has one good and no bads, for a net value of 1. For each
bridge sv with deg(v) > 0, there are deg(v) goods who can cross it (and possibly
others) and deg(v)−1 bads who can cross only it. Since no two vertices in S are
adjacent, though, for each open bridge the goods who can cross it can cross no
other open bridges. Therefore for each open bridge sv, all its deg(v) goods will
use it, which means that bridge contributes exactly deg(v)− (deg(v)− 1) = 1 to
the solution value, for a total of k.
Conversely, assume there is a bridges solution of value at least k. Observe
that no open bridge can contribute value greater than 1, since at most deg(v)
goods use it but necessarily all its deg(v)−1 bads will do so. Therefore a solution
of value k will involve opening at least k bridges. If any bridge can be closed
without decreasing the solution quality, do so, repeatedly, until there is no longer
any such bridge. At that point, the solution will consist of k open bridges, each
of value k. But again by the previous argument, in order for two bridges each to
contribute value 1, the corresponding vertices must be independent. Thus the k
vertices corresponding to the open bridges form an independent set. uunionsq
Corollary 3. The maximum-probability net-flow TN−FN setting of the Bridges
problem of [7] is no easier than the (integral) net-flow TN − FN setting.
Proof. Consider the Bridges problem instance produced in Proposition 3, but
now allow fractional bridge openings and take the max-probability objective. An
integral solution is in particular a valid fractional solution, and so the forward
direction of the iff goes through unchanged. Now assume there is a max-prob
fractional solution of value at least k. Suppose some bridge s is open with prob-
ability p, 0 < p < 1. If more bads are using s than goods, then closing s will only
improve the solution, so assume otherwise. In this case, assume that γ goods are
using s and β bads are, with γ ≥ β. Then fully opening the bridge will increase
the value of at least γ goods by amount (1− p)—any other goods that had cho-
sen other bridges that were also open with probability p will now shift to this
bridge—and will increase the value of β bads by the same amount (1 − p), for
a total change to the bridge’s net flow of at least (1 − p)γ − (1 − p)β, which is
non-negative. Therefore we can convert the fractional solution into an integral
solution of value still at least k. But then by the previous argument we can use
the solution to obtain an independent set of size k. uunionsq
Corollary 4. The maximum-probability min-error FP+FN setting of the Bridges
problem of [7] is no easier than the (integral) min-error FP + FN setting.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 3. uunionsq
Proposition 4. The Budgeted Interdiction problem in NP-hard to approximate
within factor 1− 1/e−  for any  > 0.
Proof. We reduce from Maximum Coverage, which has the stated hardness prop-
erty [5].
Given is a family of subsets Si of a ground set U = {e1, ..., en}. The task
is to choose k subsets whose union is of maximum cardinality. For each set
Si we introduce a corresponding node vi. For each element ej we introduce a
corresponding evader whose Markov chain takes it deterministically (in some
arbitrary order) through all the nodes corresponding to sets containing ej and
thence to a special target node. Then a selection of sets covering evader paths is
equivalent to a selection of sets covering elements, with exactly the same solution
value. uunionsq
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